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Abstract: The U.S. tax policy on health insurance favors only those offered a group insurance through their 
employers. This policy is highly regressive since the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the 
progressive tax system. The paper investigates alternatives to the current policy. We find that the 
complete removal of the subsidy results in a significant reduction in the insurance coverage and serious 
welfare deterioration. However, eliminating regressiveness in the group insurance subsidy and extending 
benefits to the private insurance market improve welfare and raise the coverage. Our work is the first in 
highlighting the importance of studying health policy in a general equilibrium framework with an 
endogenous demand for the health insurance. We use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to 
calibrate the process for income, health expenditure shocks, and health insurance offer status and 
succeed in producing the pattern of insurance demand as observed in the data, which serve as a solid 
benchmark for the policy experiments. 
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The aim of this paper is to study the eﬀects of tax policy on the health insurance decision
of households in a general equilibrium framework with heterogenous agents. Motivating the
economic importance of health care and health insurance poses no diﬃculty. Both in absolute
and relative terms Americans spend a sizeable amount of resources on health care. According to
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), health care expenditures account for 11.9% of GDP in
2004, more than housing services (10.6%), food (9.8%) or durable goods consumption (8.5%).1
In absolute terms, an average American spends about the $4,887 on health care. At the same
time a record number of 45 million people or 15% of the population lack health insurance.
Not surprisingly, the government is actively involved in the health insurance market through
government-run medical programs and the tax policy. In 2003 Medicare and Medicaid combined
spent $420 billion, almost 4% of GDP. A lesser-known health policy is an estimated $140 billion a
year government subsidy in the form of tax-deductibility of employer-provided health insurance.2
The origin of this policy lies in the price and wage controls in the U.S. during the World War II
when companies used the employer-provided health beneﬁts to compete for workers that were in
short supply, thereby circumventing the wage controls. Even after the price and wage controls
were lifted employers kept providing health plans because they could be ﬁnanced with pre-tax
income. The tax deductibility was extended to health insurance premiums of self-employed
individuals more recently.
We set up a general equilibrium model to evaluate the merits of the tax-deductibility of
health insurance. We investigate two main issues about the current U.S. tax policy on health
insurance. First, the policy is regressive with the progressive income tax and fails to provide
vertical equity across diﬀerent income groups. Second, the tax beneﬁts are limited to the group
insurance market and fails to satisfy horizontal equity depending on the oﬀer status of group
insurance.
To see the ﬁrst point of regressiveness, imagine that person A has low productivity, worth
$20,000 of annual labor services putting him in the 15% tax bracket, while person B has high
productivity, worth $1,000,000 of labor services putting him in the 35% tax bracket. Moreover, a
health insurance plan costs $5,000. Assume that initially employees pay for the health insurance
plan with after-tax money. If we then introduce tax-deductibility of the insurance premium
person A will save $750 and person B will save $1,750, that is, the already well-oﬀ person gains
more from the tax subsidy. From a risk-sharing point of view this regressive policy is detrimental
to welfare and our paper attempts to set up a general equilibrium model to assess the welfare
costs of this policy. Our results indicate that keeping the subsidy in place but making it less
regressive indeed increases welfare. However, we ﬁnd that removing the tax subsidy completely
would decrease welfare substantially. To restore the second issue of horizontal equity, there are
many paths the government could take. Various reform proposals are being intensely debated
in the policy arena, such as extending the deductibility to the non-group insurance market or
1OECD reports health care expenditures are 13.9% of GDP(in 2001), which also include pharmaceutical
spending.
2Figures from Gruber (2004).
1providing a subsidy for any insurance purchase. We simulate such reforms and ﬁnd they are in
fact eﬀective in raising the insurance coverage and improving welfare.
While there exists a large literature on health, to our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to set up
a model in the tradition of Aiyagari (1994) with endogenous health insurance decision. Health
expenditure shocks have been found to be very helpful in adding realism to Aiyagari-type models.
For example according to Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2003), health expenditure shocks are an
important source of consumer bankruptcies. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) add a health
expenditure shock to Aiyagari’s model and argue that the social safety net discourages savings
by low income households. Only high income households accumulate precautionary savings to
shield themselves from catastrophic health expenditures. What is common to papers in the
existing macro-literature is that health insurance is absent from the model and consequently a
household’s out-of-pocket expenditure process is exogenous.
Kotlikoﬀ (1989) builds an overlapping generations model where households face idiosyncratic
health shocks (but have no earnings uncertainty) and studies the accumulation of precautionary
savings under diﬀerent insurance schemes, such as self-payment, insurance, or Medicaid. Our
model is an improvement in the sense that we don’t need separate models for diﬀerent insurance
schemes but instead combine all three of them into one model and let households decide how
they want to deal with health expenditure shocks.
Gruber (2004) measures the eﬀects of diﬀerent subsidy policies for the non-group insurance
on the fraction of uninsured by employing a micro-simulation model that relies on reduced-form
decision rules for households.
Our micro-funded framework has advantages over many existing works that approach the
problem using reduced-form decision rules in that we can compare welfare between policy exper-
iments rather than the measure of the insured. Moreover, we can take into account important
general equilibrium eﬀects. For example, changing the tax treatment of health insurance pre-
miums will change savings behavior (and thus the aggregate capital stock and factor prices)
directly through marginal taxes as well as indirectly because the lack of health insurance drives
precautionary savings motives. It is also important to assess the ﬁscal consequences of policy
reforms. For example, expanding the subsidy may require a higher tax rate on other sources of
income in exchange and cause distortions in other sectors, or alter the demand for other social
welfare programs such as Medicaid. It is hard to perform all these with reduced form decision
rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 details the pa-
rameterizations of the model. Some parameters will be estimated with the model by matching
moments from the data. Others will be calibrated. Section 4 shows the numerical results of the
computed model both from the benchmark and from policy experiments. Section 5 concludes.
22M o d e l
2.1 Demographics
We employ an overlapping generations model with stochastic aging and dying. The economy is
populated by two generations of agents, young and old. Young people supply labor and earn
the market wage. Old agents are retired from market work and receive Social Security beneﬁts.
The young become old with probability ρo every period and the old die with probability ρd.
We assume the population remains constant. The old agents who die and leave the model are
replaced by the entry of the same number of young agents. The initial assets of the entrants are
assumed to be zero. This demographic transition pattern generates a fraction of
ρd
ρd+ρo of young
people and a fraction of
ρo
ρd+ρo of old people. All bequests are accidental and transferred in a
lump-sum manner.
2.2 Endowment
A g e n t sa r ee n d o w e dw i t haﬁxed amount of time and the young agents supply labor inelastically.
Their labor income depends on an idiosyncratic stochastic component z and the market wage w,
and it is given as wz. z is drawn from a set Z = {z1,z 2,...,zNz} and follows a Markov process
that evolves jointly with the probability of being oﬀered employer-based health insurance, which
we discuss in the next subsection. Newly born young agents make a draw from the unconditional
distribution of this process. Agents start with zero assets in the initial period.
2.3 Health and health insurance
In each period, agents face an idiosyncratic health expenditure shock x. It represents the required
cost to restore the health status back to h, which depends on the age (young or old).
Young agents have access to an insurance market, where they can purchase a contract that
would cover a fraction q(x) of the medical cost x. Therefore, with the health insurance contract,
the net cost of restoring the health will be (1 − q(x))x, while it will cost the entire x without
insurance. Notice that we allow the insurance coverage rate q to depend on the size of the medical
bill x. As we will see later in the calibration, q increases in x most likely due to deductibles.
Obviously agents must decide whether to be covered by insurance before they ﬁn do u tw h a tt h e i r
expenditure shock is.
If a young agent purchases health insurance through his employer, which we also call group
health insurance, a constant premium p must be paid to an insurance company in the year of the
coverage. We also allow for the employer to subsidize the premium. More precisely, if an agent
works for a ﬁrm that oﬀers employer-based health insurance beneﬁts, a fraction ψ ∈ [0,1] of the
premium is paid by the employer, so the marginal cost of the contract faced by the agent is only
(1 − ψ)p.
Agents that are not oﬀered health beneﬁts through their employer can purchase insurance,
too. We call this private health insurance as a opposed to group health insurance through an
employer. There are a number of important features in the private insurance market, such as
3adverse selection, exclusion of preexisting conditions or less generous beneﬁts in private health
insurance that are not included in our model. Instead, we assume that the premium paid outside
of an employer-paid plan is pm(x).
The probability of being oﬀered health insurance at work and labor productivity z evolve
jointly with a ﬁnite-state Markov process. As we discuss more in the calibration section, we do
this because the ﬁrms’ oﬀer rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly across income groups. Moreover, for workers,
the availability of such beneﬁts is highly persistent and the degree of persistence varies conditional
upon the income shocks. The transition matrix is deﬁned as ΠZ,E of dimension (Nz×2)×(Nz×2),
with an element pZ,E(z,iE;z0,i 0
E)=prob(zt+1 = z0,i E,t+1 = i0
E|zt = z,iE,t = iE). iE is an
indicator function, which takes a value 1 if the agent is oﬀered an employer-based health insurance
and 0 otherwise.
We assume that all retired agents are enrolled in a Medicare program. Each old agent pays
a ﬁxed premium pmed every period for Medicare and the program will cover the fraction qmed (x)
of the total medical expenditures.
For young agents, health expenditures x follow a ﬁnite-state Markov process drawn from a
set Xy = {xy,1,x y,2,...,x y,Nxy}, with probability pxy(xy,x 0
y)=prob(xy,t+1 = x0
y|xy,t = xy).T h e
process for old agents are similarly deﬁn e dw i t had i ﬀerent subscript. Newly born young agents
draw an expenditures shock x from the stationary distribution over the set Xy. When the young
become old, they make a draw from the set Xo according to the transition matrix of the old
agents conditional upon the state in the previous period as young.3
2.4 Preferences
Following earlier research by Kotlikoﬀ (1989), we assume that health enters the utility function




,j = y (young) or o (old),
where c is consumption and hj is the health status for the young or the old, that determines the
marginal utility from consumption. Grossman (1972) treats health as an endogenous variable
much like a durable good that can depreciate, but can also be restored to any desired level.
Currently the hy,h o are given exogenously, so one could interpret our model as a Grossman
model where health depreciates but it has to be restored back to the level hj which will incur
a health expenditure x. Therefore, the hj have only one function in the current version of the
paper, namely to create more realistic life-cycle consumption patterns. We might endogenize the
h decision in future versions of our paper.
Agents discount future utility by a constant subjective discount factor β.
3This assumption requires the sets Xy and Xo to have the same number of elements, as we do in calibration.
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where K and L are the aggregate capital and labor eﬃciency units employed by the ﬁrm’s sector
and A is the total factor productivity, which we assume is constant. Capital depreciates at rate
δ every period.
As discussed above, if a ﬁrm oﬀers employer-based health insurance beneﬁts to its employees,
af r a c t i o nψ ∈ [0,1] of the insurance premium is paid at the ﬁrm level. The ﬁrm needs to adjust
the wage to ensure the zero proﬁt condition. The cost cE is subtracted from the marginal product
of labor, which is just enough to cover the total premium cost that the ﬁrm has to pay.4 The
adjusted wage is given as
wE = w − cE, (2)







j zj¯ pZ,E(j|iE =1 )
, (3)
where µins
E is the fraction of workers that purchase health insurance, conditional on being of-
f e r e de m p l o y e r - b a s e dh e a l t hi n s u r a n c eb e n e ﬁts, i.e. iE =1 .5 ¯ pZ,E(j|iE =1 )is the stationary
probability of drawing productivity zj conditional on iE =1 .6
2.6 The government
We impose balanced budget every period. The Social Security and Medicare systems are self-
ﬁnanced. Both Medicare and Social Security charge proportional taxes τmed and τss on labor
income and therefore, total payroll taxes as a function of labor income wz are given as (τmed +
τss)wz.
The government levies tax on income and consumption to ﬁnance expenditures G and Social
Insurance program. Labor and capital income are taxed according to a progressive tax function
following Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and consumption is taxed at a proportional rate τc.M o r e
details on the tax system are provided in the calibration section.
4The assumption behind this wage setting rule is that a ﬁrm does not observe states of a worker (a, z, x and
i) and does not adjust salary according to them. A ﬁrm simply employs eﬃciency units that consist of a mix of
workers of diﬀerent states according to their distribution.
The employer-based insurance system with a competitive ﬁrm in essence implies a transfer of a subsidy from
uninsured to insured workers. Our particular wage setting rule assumes the subsidy for each worker per eﬃciency
unit is the same across agents in the ﬁrm.
5It is computed as µins
E =
P
s µ(s|j = y,iHI =1 ,i E =1 ) /
P
s µ(s|j = y,iE =1 ) .
6It is easy to verify this wage setting rule satisﬁes the zero proﬁt condition of a ﬁrm that employs labor N:
wN = (total salary) + (total insurance costs paid by the ﬁrm).
5Social Insurance There is a “safety net” provided by the government, which we call Social
Insurance. The government guarantees a minimum level of consumption ¯ c for every agent by
supplementing the income in case the household’s disposable assets fall below ¯ c.T h i s S o c i a l
Insurance program stands in for Medicaid, Food Stamp Program and all other social assistance
programs. We will discuss the mechanism more in detail in the households’ problem.
2.7 Households
The state for a young agent is summarized as a vector sy =( a,z,x,iHI,i E),w h e r ea is assets
brought into the period, z is the idiosyncratic shock to productivity, x is the idiosyncratic health
expenditure shock from last period that has to be paid in the current period, iHI is an indicator
function that takes a value 1 if the agent held health insurance in the last period and 0 otherwise.
iE is another indicator function for availability of employer-based health insurance beneﬁts in
the current period.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s .T h ea g e n to b s e r v e st h es t a t e(a,z,x,iHI,i E) at the begin-
ning of the period, then pays last period’s health care bill x, makes the consumption and savings
decision, pays taxes and receives transfers and also decides on whether to be covered by health
insurance. After the agent made all decisions this period’s health expenditure shock x0 and next
period’s productivity and oﬀer status are revealed. Together with the policies a0 and i0
HI they
form next period’s state s0
y =( a0,z0,x 0,i 0
HI,i 0
E). Notice that our setup makes sure that the agent
makes the health insurance decision i0
HI a f t e rh eo rs h eﬁnds out whether the employer oﬀers
group insurance but before the health expenditure shock for the current period x0 is known. Also
notice that agents pay an insurance premium the year before payment occurs. We therefore
assume that the insurance company earns interest on the premium for one period.
Since the health insurance contracts for young workers and retirees diﬀer and agents pay
their health care bills with a one period lag we have to distinguish between new and existing
old people. A recent retiree which we call ‘recently aged’ has to pay the health care bill of his
last year as a young agent, potentially covered by an insurance contract for young agents, while
an existing old person was covered by Medicare and potentially supplemental health insurance
last period. As a result, the state for recently aged agents is given as sr =( a,x,iHI) and for old
agents so =( a,x).
We are now ready to deﬁne the maximization problems of all three types of agents in recursive
f o r m .I nt h ev a l u ef u n c t i o n st h es u b s c r i p td e n o t e st h et y p eo fa g e n t ,w h e r ey stands for young
agents, r stands for recently aged and o refers to existing old agents:
Young’s problem


















(1 + τc)c + a







Tax = T(y)+0 .5(τmed + τss)(˜ wz − iE · ˜ p) (6)
y =m a x {˜ wz + r(a + TB) − iE · ˜ p,0} (7)
TSI =m a x {0,(1 + τc)¯ c +( 1− iHI · q(x))x + T(˜ y) −˜ wz − (1 + r)(a + TB)} (8)
˜ y =˜ wz + r(a + TB)
˜ w =
½
(1 − 0.5(τmed + τss))w if iE =0





p · (1 − ψ) if i0
HI =1and iE =1
pm(x) if i0




The young agents’ choice variables are (c,a0,i 0
HI),w h e r ec is consumption, a0 is savings and
i0
HI is the indicator variable for the this period’s health insurance which covers expenditures that
show up in next period’s budget constraint. Remember that the current state x is last period’s
expenditure shock while the current period’s expenditure x0 is not known when the agents makes
the insurance coverage decision.
With probability (1−ρo) the agent remains young in the next period and with probability ρo
becomes old and retired. In the latter case, the agent’s value function will be that of a recently
aged old, Vr(s0
o)=Vr(a0,x 0,i 0
HI),w h i c hw ed e ﬁne below.
Equation (5) is the ﬂow budget constraint of a young agent. Consumption, saving, medical
expenditures and payment for the insurance contract must be ﬁnanced by labor income, saving
from previous period and a lump sum bequest transfer plus accrued interest, (1 + r)(a + TB),
net of income and payroll taxes, Tax plus Social Insurance transfer TSI if applicable. ˜ w is the
wage per eﬃciency unit already adjusted by the employer’s portion of payroll taxes and beneﬁts
cost as speciﬁed in (9). If the agent’s employer does not oﬀer health insurance beneﬁts, it equals
(1 − 0.5(τmed + τss))w, that is, marginal product of labor net of employer payroll taxes. If the
employer does oﬀer insurance, the wage is reduced by both cE, which is the health insurance cost
paid by a ﬁrm as deﬁned in equations (2) and (3), and the payroll tax. Consequently, one could
interpret the ˜ wz as the gross salary.
Payroll taxes are imposed on the wage income net of paid insurance premium if it is provided
t h r o u g ha ne m p l o y e r ,a ss h o w ni nt h eR H So fe q u a t i o n6 . 7 Equation (7) represents the income
7To be precise, the payroll tax base at each of ﬁrm and individual levels is bounded below by zero, and we
have
Tax= T(y)+0 .5(τmed + τss) · max{ ˜ wz − iE · ˜ p,0}.
For simplicity we present it as in equation (6), which is applicable when the zero boundary condition does not
bind. The zero lower bound condition also applies for the employer portion of payroll taxes.
7tax base; labor income paid to a worker plus accrued interest on savings and bequests less the
i n s u r a n c ep r e m i u m ,a g a i np r o v i d e dt h a tt h ep u r c h a s ei st h r o u g ht h ee m p l o y e r . T h et a x e sa r e
bounded below by zero.
The term TSI in (8) is a government transfer making sure that after receiving income, paying
taxes and health care costs, an individual is guaranteed a minimum level ¯ c of consumption.
Also notice that the health insurance premium is not covered under the government’s transfer
program.
The marginal cost of the insurance premium ˜ p depends on the state iE as given in equa-
tion (10).8
Recently aged agent’s problem
Vr (so)=m a x




(1 + τc)c + a
0 +( 1− iHIq(x))x = ss − pmed +( 1+r)(a + TB) − T(y)+TSI
y = r(a + TB)
TSI =m a x {0,(1 + τc)¯ c +( 1− iHIq(x))x
+pmed − ss − (1 + r)(a + TB)+T(y)}
a
0 ≥ 0
ss is the Social Security beneﬁtp a y m e n t .
Existing old’s problem
Vo (so)=m a x




(1 + τc)c + a
0 +( 1− qmed (x))x = ss − pmed +( 1+r)(a + TB) − T(y)+TSI
y = r(a + TB)
TSI =m a x {0,(1 + τc)¯ c +( 1− qmed (x))x
+pmed − ss − (1 + r)(a + TB)+T(y)}
a
0 ≥ 0
8Theoretically, agents who are oﬀered insurance by employers also have access to the individual insurance
market and can purchase a contract at the market price, which depends on the individual health status. Given
the same coverage ratios oﬀered by each contract, agents choose one at a lower cost, also taking into account the
tax break which can be applied only when they choose to purchase an employer-based contract. In our calibrated
model, however, no one chooses to buy an individual contract in such a case since the fraction ψ paid by employers
makes an employer-based contract more attractive, even for the agents with the best health condition, who could
buy a contract in the market at the lowest price. Hence we present the premium ˜ p = py(1−ψ),w h e niE =1and
i0
HI =1 .
82.8 Health insurance company
The health insurance company is competitive, that is, it charges premia p and {pm (x)}x∈Xy that
precisely cover all expenditures on the insured.
2.9 Stationary competitive equilibrium
We deﬁne a stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy. At the beginning of the period,
each young agent is characterized by a state vector sy =( a,z,x,iHI,i E), i.e. asset holdings a,
labor productivity z, health care expenditure x, and indicator functions for insurance holding
iHI, and employer-based insurance beneﬁts iE. Old agent have state vectors syo =( a,x,iHI) and
so =( a,x), depending on whether they are recently retired or existing old. Let a ∈ A = R+,
z ∈ Z, x ∈ Xj, iHI,i E ∈ I = {0,1} and j ∈ J = {y,r,o} and denote by S = {J}×{Sy,Sr,So} the
entire state space of the agents, where Sy = A×Z× Xy ×I2 and Sr,So = A ×Xo ×I.L e ts ∈ S
denote a general state vector of an agent: s ∈ {y}×Sy if young, s ∈ {r}×Sr if recently retired
and s ∈ {o}×So if old. The equilibrium is given by
• interest rates r,w a g er a t ew and adjusted wage wE,
• allocation functions {c,a0,i 0
HI} and for young {c,a0} for type r,o agents
• government tax system given by income tax function T(I) consumption tax τc,M e d i c a r e
system {pmed,q med} and Social Insurance program,
• accidental bequests transfer TB,
• the private health insurance contracts given as pairs of premium and coverage ratios {p,q},
{pm,q}.
• a set of value functions {Vy(sy)}sy∈Sy,{Vr(sr)}sr∈Sr and {Vo(so)}so∈So,a n d
• distribution of people over the state space S given by µ(s),
such that
1. Given the interest rates, the wage, the government tax system, Medicare and the Social
Insurance program, and the private health insurance contract, the allocations solve the
above described maximization problem for each agent.
2. The riskless rate r and wage rate w satisfy marginal productivity conditions, i.e. r =
FK(K,L) − δ and w = FL(K,L),w h e r eK and L are total capital and labor employed in
the ﬁrm’s sector.
93. A ﬁrm that oﬀers employer-health insurance beneﬁts pays the wage adjusted for the cost,
given as
wE = w − cE,
where cE is the cost of health insurance premium per eﬃciency unit paid by a ﬁrm, as
deﬁned in (3).














5. The health insurance company is competitive:
(1 + r)p =
R P
x0 πy (x0|x)x0q(x0)i0
HI (s)µ(s|j = y)ds R
iEi0
HI (s)µ(s|j = y)ds
(1 + r)pm(¯ x)=
R P
x0 πy (x0|¯ x)x0q(x0)i0
HI (s)µ(s|x =¯ x;j = y)ds R
(1 − iE)i0
HI (s)µ(s|x =¯ x;j = y)ds
∀¯ x






where y(s) is the taxable income for an agent with a state vector s.
7. Social Security system is self-ﬁnanced.
ss
Z
µ(s|j = r,o)ds = τss
Z
(˜ wz − 0.5i
0
HI · iE · p(1 − ψ))µ(s|j = y)ds
8. Medicare program is self-ﬁnanced.
Z
qmed (x)xµ(s|j = o)ds = τmed
Z
(˜ wz − 0.5i
0















1010. An aggregate resource constraint:








11. Law of motion for the distribution of agents over the state space S satisﬁes
µt+1 = Rµ(µt).
where Rµ is a one-period transition operator on the distribution.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section, we specify the parameters used in the simulations. Table 1 summarizes the values
and description of the parameters.
3.1 Demographics
A model period corresponds to one year. We deﬁne the two generations as follows. Young agents
are between the ages of 20 and 64, while old agents are 65 and over. The probability of becoming
old ρo is set at 1/45 to make sure that agents stay young for an average of 45 years. The death
probability ρd is calibrated so that the old agents above age 65 constitute 20% of the population,
based on data from the panel data set below. This is a slight deviation from the 17.4% in the
Census because we restrict our attention to head of households. We abstract from population
growth and the demographic structure remains the same across periods. Every period a measure
ρoρd
ρo+ρd of young agents enter the economy to replace the deceased old agents.
3.2 Endowment, health insurance and health expenditures
3.2.1 Data Source
For endowment, health expenditure shocks and health insurance, we use income and health
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is based on a series of national
surveys conducted by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ). The MEPS
consists of six two-year panels 1996/1997 up to 2001/2002 with the usual data on demographics,
income and most importantly data on health expenditures and insurance, though we drop the
ﬁrst panel because one crucial variable that we need in determining the joint endowment and
11insurance oﬀer process is missing. We can then calibrate the processes for income and health
expenditures and insurance from the same source.
We include all heads of households (both male and female) with non-negative income deﬁned
as the sum of labor, business and sales income, unlike many existing studies in the vast literature
on stochastic income process (for example, Storesletten, et al (2004), who use households to
study earnings process, and Heathcote, et al (2004), who use white male heads of households
to estimate wage process). The main reason for not relying on those studies is that we want to
capture the individual characteristics associated with health insurance and health expenditures
across the dimension of the income shocks. It is possible only by using comprehensive database
like MEPS. In terms of sample units, we choose individuals rather than households to better
capture the process for individual health expenditures. Treating health expenditures of a family
unit would require adjusting them for diﬀerent family sizes to ﬁt in our model and will inevitably
bias the estimates of persistence. We choose heads instead of all individuals since many non-
head individuals are covered by their spouses’ health insurance. We include both male and female
heads in order to have a larger number of samples, and more importantly, not to drop samples
with zero or low assets.
Our model captures those with zero or very low level of assets, who would be eligible for
public welfare assistance. Many households that fall in this category are headed by females and
restricting samples to males does not provide us with a good approximation. In addition, most of
the studies are focused on samples with strictly positive income, often with income above some
threshold level and such treatment does not ﬁt in our model, either.
Since for young agents we estimate a joint process of income and the group insurance oﬀer
status we restrict our attention to those young agents that can be uniquely identiﬁed as either
being oﬀered or not being oﬀered insurance. Agents that are oﬀered insurance can be easily
identiﬁed in MEPS by the corresponding dummy variable. Notice that in the data by deﬁnition
only those agents that are employed can have an insurance oﬀer status. Since we want to
generate an income process for both employed and unemployed agents, we consider agents not
oﬀered insurance being those that according to MEPS are employed and not oﬀered insurance
plus those not currently employed who will have an “inapplicable” oﬀer status.9 For consistency
purposes we also restrict our attention to the same set of agents when we calibrate the health
expenditure process for young agents.
3.2.2 Endowment
We calibrate the endowment process jointly with the stochastic probability of being oﬀered
employer-based health insurance, for the reasons we discussed in the model section. For the
income process, we avoid the detour of ﬁrst estimating an AR(1) process and then discretizing
it with the methods put forth by Tauchen (1986). Instead we specify the income distribution
9This implies that we disregard about 10% of the people in the MEPS, namely those that are employed but
have unknown/inapplicable insurance oﬀer status and those with unknown employment status. This restriction
will not change the shape of the Markov processes in any systematic way. For example comparing the transition
probabilities between income groups (unconditional on insurance oﬀer status) between the full and the restricted
sample does not generate substantial diﬀerences.
12over the 5 income states so that in each year, an equal number of agents belong to each of the
ﬁve bins of equal size. Then we determine for each individual in which bin he or she resides in
the two consecutive years and thus construct the joint transition probabilities πZ,E(z,iE|z0,i 0
E)
of going from income bin z with insurance status iE to income bin z0 with i0
E.R e c a l l iE is
an indicator function that takes a value 1 if employer-based health insurance is oﬀered and 0
otherwise. The joint Markov process is deﬁned over Nz ×2 states with a transition matrix ΠZ,E
of size (Nz ×2)×(Nz ×2). We average the transition probabilities over the ﬁve panels weighted
by the number of people in each panel.
The transition probabilities averaged over the ﬁve panels are
ΠZ,E =

             

0.158 0.237 0.117 0.130 0.096 0.149 0.102 0.011 0.000 0.000
0.059 0.479 0.209 0.073 0.042 0.041 0.066 0.020 0.008 0.002
0.022 0.176 0.496 0.179 0.070 0.009 0.018 0.019 0.007 0.005
0.011 0.058 0.187 0.540 0.176 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005
0.012 0.026 0.057 0.169 0.710 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.010
0.007 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.811 0.107 0.028 0.017 0.008
0.014 0.055 0.041 0.017 0.006 0.178 0.466 0.141 0.051 0.031
0.003 0.019 0.055 0.042 0.013 0.095 0.254 0.328 0.123 0.067
0.001 0.012 0.039 0.043 0.017 0.052 0.132 0.195 0.332 0.178
0.000 0.001 0.007 0.019 0.048 0.065 0.118 0.132 0.180 0.428

             

Entries 1 to 5 from the top are the income bins 1 to 5 with employer-based insurance and entries
6t o1 0a r et h eﬁve income groups without insurance oﬀered. For example, for the probability of
moving to income bin 2 without insurance next period, conditional upon being in income bin 3
with insurance this today is 1.8%, given by the entry (3,7).
Finally, in order to get the grids for z, we compute the average income in each of the ﬁve bins
in 2001 dollars and normalize so that the average income is one:10
Z = {0.042,0.493,0.856,1.295,2.533}
Notice that the income shocks look quite diﬀerent from the ones normally used in the literature
in that we include all heads of households, even those with zero income. This generates an
extremely low income shock of near zero (only 4.5% of average income) for a sizeable measure of
the population.
3.2.3 Health expenditure shocks
In the same way as for the endowment process, we estimate the process of health expenditure
shocks and the transition probabilities directly from MEPS data. Again we use ﬁve states. For
both young and old we specify the bins of size (0.40,0.40,0.15,0.04,0.01). For young agents we
10Average income per person in 2001 was $33,205.
13get the following transition probabilities
Πxy =

   

0.667 0.268 0.052 0.011 0.002
0.268 0.541 0.154 0.030 0.007
0.143 0.414 0.343 0.087 0.014
0.095 0.320 0.335 0.191 0.059
0.058 0.163 0.292 0.253 0.235





which are the mean expenditures in the ﬁve bins in the ﬁrst year of the last panel, that is, in
the year 2001. The expenditures are normalized in terms of their ratios to the average income
in 2001. This parametrization generates average expenditures of 8.37% of mean labor income in
the young generation or $2552 in year 2001 dollars.
Notice that the big advantage of our procedure is that we can specify the bins ourselves.
Average expenditures in the ﬁr s tb i na r ej u s t0.5% of average income which implies that there is
very little action in the bottom 40 percent of the expenditure distribution. In contrast, expen-
ditures vary wildly at the top. For example the top 1% have average expenditures of more than
1.5 times the average income (almost $50,000 in 2001). The next 4% have average expenditures
of slightly less than 50% of average income ($14,700 in 2001) while the following 15% spend less
than 20% of average income ($5,500 in 2001).
Likewise, using the strategy for the old generation we compute
Πxo =

   

0.668 0.251 0.065 0.014 0.002
0.265 0.547 0.148 0.033 0.007
0.147 0.436 0.324 0.071 0.021
0.075 0.312 0.336 0.205 0.072
0.141 0.299 0.266 0.188 0.106





which generates unconditional expectation of xo of 20.64% of mean income or $6,297 in year 2001
dollars.
3.3 Health Insurance
T h ec o v e r a g er a t i o sa r ec a l i b r a t e du s i n gt h es a m eﬁve MEPS panels as before. We average over
the ﬁve panels and determine the share of expenditures covered by private insurance (conditional






There is a proportional operational cost φ incurred by insurance companies, which is passed
through to the insurance premiums. We assume this cost is a waste (‘thrown away into the
ocean’) and does not contribute to anything. The parameter φ is calibrated so that the model
achieves the overall take-up ratio of 80% as in the data (MEPS).
The group premium p is determined in equilibrium to ensure zero proﬁts for the insurance
company in the group insurance market. We know that the average annual premium of an
employer-based health insurance was $2,051 in 199711 or about 7% of annual average labor
income. Model simulations yields a premium of 6.97% of average annual labor income.
A ﬁrm oﬀering employer-based health insurance pays a fraction ψ of the premium. According
t ot h eM e d i c a lE x p e n d i t u r eP a n e lS u r v e y( M E P S ) ,t h ea v e r a g ep e r c e n to ft o t a lp r e m i u mp a i d
by employee is 15.6% in 1997.12 Other studies estimate similar ﬁgures and we set it to 15%.13
With regards to private health insurance, we assume that the insurance company sets pm(x)




The expectation is with respect to the next period’s expenditures x0, and we compute the pre-







One could interpret this as the agents who apply for private health insurance revealing their
past medical history and the insurance company charging a premium that ensures zero expected
proﬁts for each medical expenditure bin.
11Source: MEPS Methodology Report 14, “Estimation of Expenditures and Enrollments for Employer Spon-
sored Heath Insurance, by John Paul Sommers.
12Source: “Estimation of Expenditures and Enrollments for Employer Sponsored Health Insurance," by John
Paul Sommers, MEPS Methodology Report 14
1315.1% by National Employer Health Insurance Survey in 1993 and 16% by Employer Health Beneﬁts Survey
in 1999.
153.4 Preferences
To determine the health parameters (hy,h o) we use data from Domeij and Johannesson (2004)
on average health measures for diﬀerent age groups and then compute the mean health over
the two age groups in our model. Normalizing health of the young to one we then ﬁnd that
ho =0 .7738.W ec a l i b r a t et h ea n n u a ld i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ to achieve an aggregate capital output
ratio K/Y =3 .0 and choose a risk aversion parameter of σ =2 .
3.5 Technology
Total factor productivity A is normalized so that marginal product of labor equals one in the
benchmark. As is standard in the literature the capital share is α =0 .36. For the depreciation
rate we pick δ =0 .06 following Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
3.6 Government
3.6.1 Expenditures and taxation
The value for G, that is, the part of government spending not dedicated to Social Insurance
transfers, is exogenously given and it is ﬁxed across all policy experiments. We calibrate it to
18% of GDP in the benchmark economy in order to match the share of government consumption
and gross investment excluding transfers, at the federal, state and local levels (The Economic
Report of the President (2004)). We set the consumption tax rate τc at 5.67%, based on the
study by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994).14
The income tax function consists of two parts, a progressive income tax and proportional tax
on income. The progressive part mimics the actual income tax in the real world following the
functional form of Gouveia and Strauss (1994), while the proportional part stands in for all other
taxes, that is, non-income and non-consumption taxes that - for simplicity - we lump together







Parameter a0 is the limit of marginal taxes in the progressive part as income goes to inﬁnity, a1
determines the curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. To preserve the shape
of the Gouveia and Strauss tax function we use their estimates
a0 =0 .258
a1 =0 .768
and choose the scaling parameter a2 such that the share of government expenditures raised by
the progressive part of the tax function a0
©
y − (y−a1 + a2)−1/a1ª
equals 0.6472. This matches the
14The consumption tax rate is the average over the years 1965-1996. The original paper contains data for
the period 1965-1988 and we use an unpublished extension for 1989-1996 for recent data available on Mendoza’s
webpage.
16fraction of total revenues ﬁnanced by income tax according to the OECD Revenue Statistics. The
parameter a2 is calibrated within the model because it depends on other endogenous variables.
The parameter τy in the proportional term is chosen to balance the overall government budget
and it, too, will be determined in the model’s equilibrium.
3.6.2 Social Insurance program
The threshold level ¯ c of minimum consumption to be eligible for Social Insurance is calibrated
so that the model achieves the target share of households with a low level of assets. Households
with net worth of less than $5,000 constitute 20.0% (taken from Kennickell (2003), averaged over
1989, 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 SCF data, in 2001 dollars) and we use this ﬁgure as a target to
match in the benchmark equilibrium.
3.6.3 Social Security system




µ(s|j = o)ds = ρ
Z
˜ wzµ(s|j = y)ds
Z
µ(s|j = o)ds = τss
Z
˜ wzµ(s|j = y)ds,
where the Social Security beneﬁt ss is the replacement ratio times the average wage. Therefore,
we have the relationship τss = ρ× (% of old) / (% of young) yielding a tax rate τss =1 0 .57%,
which is close to the current Social Security tax rate of 12.4%.
3.6.4 Medicare
Just as in the case of private insurance we calculate the coverage ratio of Medicare in the ﬁve







The Medicare premium was $799.20 annually in the year 2004 or about 2.11% of annual GDP
($37,800 per person in 2004) which is the ratio that we use in the simulations. The Medicare
tax rate τmed is determined within the model so that the Medicare system is self-ﬁnanced. In
2003 the Medicare tax rate was 2.9% and its expenditures were about 2.3% of GDP. The model
generates expenditures and revenues equal to 2.03% of labor income. This ﬁgure is slightly lower
than in reality for two reasons. First, in our model Medicare is reserved exclusively for the old
generation while the actual Medicare system pays certain expenditures even for young agents.
Second, payroll taxes apply to all of labor income while in reality there is a threshold level of
currently $87,900 after which the marginal payroll tax is zero.
174N u m e r i c a l r e s u l t s
4.1 Benchmark model
Although we don’t calibrate the model to generate the patterns of health insurance across the
dimension of individual states, our model succeeds in matching them fairly well not only quan-
titatively but in most cases even quantitatively.
The health insurance take-up ratio, that is the share of insured agents, conditional on being
oﬀered group insurance is nearly 100% both in the data and our model, and it is 97.3% and
99.5% respectively. The coverage among agents without an access to the group insurance is
much lower, 49.3% in the data and 56.3% in the model. Table 2 displays the take-up ratios over
health expenditures. Expenditures are expressed in terms of the average labor income. TUR all
indicates the overall take-up ratio, TUR G is the take-up ratio conditional on being oﬀered the
group insurance, and TUR noG is the take-up ratio conditional on having no access to the group
insurance.
In the model, the TUR G for the lowest expenditure bin is slightly oﬀ the data - 99.4% as
opposed to 95.2% in the data. One possible reason is associated with our assumption that all the
employers pay 85% of the premium at the ﬁrm level, which is based on the average subsidy ratio
in the data. In practice, however, some ﬁrms cover 100% of the premium and others are less
generous. With a small chance of a high health spending in the immediate future, the healthiest
agents may choose not be insured if the employer subsidy is suﬃciently low.
For the TUR noG,w em a t c ht h ed a t af a i r l yw e l le x c e p tf o rt h er a t i of o rx1, the healthiest
people. There are some factors that could explain the disparity. First, we make a simplifying
assumption that there is no information problem as to the health status and an insurance com-
pany can charge a break-even price for each x. However, in reality, the health status may not
be perfectly observed and the premium can be higher than the lowest price for x1 that we use
in the model. Second, there may be some optimism in reality when you’re so young and healthy
that you don’t evaluate the risk of health properly. This is something that we can’t capture in
the model and may contribute to a lower take-up ratio.
Table 3 displays the take-up ratios for the ﬁve income bins that correspond to the ones in the
(Z,E) Markov process. Both in the data and model, take-up ratios increase with income, except
for a slight decrease in the highest income bin with no group insurance in the model. The take-up
ratios among the agents with a group insurance oﬀer are high, reaching the perfect coverage in
the model except for the group with the lowest income. When agents have no access to the group
insurance and have a very low or nearly zero income, the take-up ratio drops signiﬁcantly. Recall
that we capture agents with no labor income and do not impose any income threshold. Many of
them also own a low level of assets and are more likely to be eligible for the Social Insurance. In
case the agents face a high expenditure shock and can only purchase a private health insurance at
a high premium, they may choose to remain uninsured and hope to receive the Social Insurance.
184.2 Policy experiments
We now conduct experiments to determine the eﬀect of changes in the tax treatment of health
insurance. In the experiments, we treat changes in the government revenue as follows: expen-
ditures G, consumption tax rate τc and the progressive part of the income tax function remain
unchanged from the benchmark. We adjust the proportional tax rate τy to balance the govern-
ment budget. Medicare and Social Security systems remain self-ﬁnanced and the revenue will
also be aﬀected because labor income changes. We ﬁx the Medicare premium pmed (in terms of
its ratio to output) at the benchmark level and adjust the tax rate τmed to maintain the balance.
For the Social Security system, we keep the replacement ratio ﬁxed and adjust the retirement
beneﬁt ss to account for the changes in the average labor income.
In each case we compute steady state outcomes. To compare welfare across experiments, we





Vy(s|a =0 ,x= x1,i HI =0 )· ¯ pz,E
It is the average of value function for new born agents. ¯ pz,E is the stationary distribution of
z and E. In order to compare social welfare in the experiment and benchmark economies, we
compute the consumption equivalent variation, that is the proportional change in consumption
in all dates and states of the benchmark economy that makes agents indiﬀerent between the
benchmark and the experiment.
4.2.1 Abolishing tax deductibility of group premium costs / ﬁxing regressiveness
In the ﬁrst set of experiments, we let the government abolish the current deductibility of premium
for the purpose of income tax. Income tax is collected on the entire portion of the premium.
The taxable income is given as
y =˜ wz + r(a + TB)+iEi
0
HIψp.
Note that not only is the employee portion iEi0
HI (1 − ψ)p no longer tax-deductible, but also the
portion paid by the employer is subject to taxation and considered as part of taxable income.
This policy will eliminate the regressiveness of the system and restore the vertical inequality
created by the progressiveness of the income tax function. For the payroll tax, we consider
diﬀerent scenarios. The ﬁv ee x p e r i m e n t sw ed i s c u s sb e l o wd i ﬀer in the way the government
provides subsidy for the purchase of group or private insurance.
Experiment results are summarized in Table 4. Commonly to other experiment results, the
top section displays some statistics on health insurance: the premium of group insurance p,t h e
overall take-up ratio TUR all, the take-up ratio conditional on not being oﬀered group insurance
TUR noG and oﬀered group insurance TUR G.T h e l a s t t w o r o w s Group and Private show the
break-down of TUR G, i.e. the fraction of agents who bought a group insurance (Group)o ra
private insurance (Private) conditional on being oﬀered a group insurance. The bottom section
displays the aggregate variables including the proportional tax rate τy on income that balances
the government budget and consumption equivalent variation CEV.
19The ﬁrst experiment (Experiment 1-A) invokes a rather radical change - the government
abolishes the entire deductibility of group insurance premium for both income and payroll tax
purposes, and does nothing else. The policy leads to a partial collapse of the group insurance
market. Those with the lowest health expenditure shock will opt out of the group insurance
m a r k e ta n dc h o o s et ob ei n s u r e di nt h ep r i v a t em a r k e t ,i fa n y . I tt r i g g e r st h ed e t e r i o r a t i o no f
health quality in the group insurance market and the group insurance premium pHI goes up to
$2,974, a huge jump of $900 from the benchmark. The overall coverage ratio falls by as much
as 8%. Although the proportional tax rate τy on income is lower than in the benchmark, it is
far from enough to compensate for the welfare loss. The low take-up ratio implies more agents
are exposed to the health expenditures shock and more ﬂuctuation of disposable income. While
increased income uncertainty would induce more precautionary savings in general, it is not the
case here. The reason is because the agents who drop out of the insurance market are the
healthiest faced with minimal spending on the health care and less likely to be urged to increase
savings signiﬁcantly.
In the next three experiments, the government attempts to correct for regressiveness of the
current system and distribute the tax-deductibility more evenly. More precisely, the government
abolishes the premium deductibility for the income tax purposes as in Experiment 1-A, and in
exchange it gives back a lump-sum subsidy for the purchase of an insurance.
In Experiment 1-B, we assume that the subsidy is given to the purchase of a group insurance
at the average income tax rate in the benchmark. The idea is that the government returns the
increased revenues due to the abolishment of deductions in the form of lump-sum subsidy, though
of course the increase in the revenue and the cost of subsidy will not match exactly because of
changes in the insurance demand and other general equilibrium eﬀects. As shown in Table 4,
everyone oﬀered a group insurance purchases one under this policy. Compared to the benchmark,
this policy is more beneﬁcial if the agent with a group insurance oﬀer belongs to lower income
bins, since the deduction was based on their lower tax brackets (or none if unemployed without
any income) under the benchmark and the subsidy based on the average tax rate in 1-B is higher
than the beneﬁt from the deduction. Everyone who was in the lowest income bin as shown in
Table 4 (TURG for z1) now decides to sign up and the perfect TUR is achieved in the group
insurance market. The required proportional tax rate τy on income is slightly lower than in the
benchmark, since the government can collect more tax revenues from the non-linear progressive
part of the income tax function. That is, the premium is no longer deductible and added back
to the income tax base, which pushes up the marginal tax rate given the progressiveness of the
t a xs y s t e m .T h ed e c r e a s ei nτy also contributes to the small rise in TURnoG due to the increased
after-tax income and assets. The overall take-up ratio is about a percentage point higher and
t h ee x - a n t ew e l f a r ei sm a r g i n a l l ya b o v et h eb e n c h m a r kl e v e l .
In Experiments 1-C and 1-D, the government aims to achieve horizontal equality as well by
extending a subsidy to the private insurance market. If an agent has no access to the group
insurance, a subsidy of $1,000 is provided for the purchase of the private insurance. The subsidy
is capped by the actual cost of insurance. In Experiment 1-D, the subsidy will phase out if
the agent’s income exceeds $30,000. In both experiments, the group insurance is treated as
in Experiment 1-B, i.e. there is no income tax deductibility but the government will provide
20the subsidy for the group insurance at the average income tax rate. As shown in Table 4, the
take-up ratio of the private insurance signiﬁcantly increases in both cases. While the income
tax rate τy will be higher than in the benchmark or in the previous two experiments due to
the increased cost of subsidy, this alone does not dominate the net eﬀect on welfare and the
equivalent variations exhibit an increase. Also note that in both experiments the fraction of
people covered by the Social Insurance program is about 0.3% lower than in the benchmark (not
displayed in the Table), which helps reduce the government expenditures to be ﬁnanced by the
income taxation.
The comparison of the results in Experiments 1-C and 1-D poses a question of costs and
eﬃciency in targeting beneﬁciaries. By restricting the eligibility to the lower income households
in 1-D, the required tax increase from the benchmark is 0.35% as opposed to 0.66% in 1-C. The
policy increases the overall TUR by 12.4% and 13.7%, relatively small diﬀerence compared to
the larger diﬀerence in terms of ﬁscal costs. It becomes more costly to provide an incentive to
be insured as the agents’ incomes are higher, since the rich households with more assets are
better insured by their accumulated savings. Widening the target is easier to implement, but it
is equally important to consider eﬃciency. In fact, we achieve a slightly larger welfare gain by
the policy with the income cutoﬀ than by the unconditional subsidy policy.
4.2.2 Extending tax deductibility or subsidy to the non-group insurance market
In the next policy experiments, the government keeps the current deductibility for the group
insurance untouched and aims to correct for the horizontal equity by providing a subsidy to the
private insurance purchase.
Results are summarized in Table 5. In Experiment 2-A, we extend the same tax advantage
for the group insurance to the agents without an access to the group insurance. Agents who
purchase a contract in the private market can deduct the premium cost from the income and
payroll tax bases. As shown in Table 5, the policy would increase the private insurance coverage
by as much as 18% and the overall coverage by 8%. While the government will face an increased
cost of providing deductions, the required hike in the tax rate is not so large; τy is 4.849% as
opposed to 4.546% in the benchmark. One reason is the lower coverage ratio for the Social
Insurance. Being more insured against medical expenditures shocks, there are less people who
face a catastrophic health expenditure shock that would make them be eligible for the Social
Insurance coverage. The fraction of the total population covered by the Social Insurance is lower
at 7.51% compared to 7.67% in the benchmark.
In Experiments 2-B and 2-C, the government oﬀers a subsidy of $1,000 for the purchase of
a private insurance contract, if the person is not oﬀered a group insurance. In Experiment 2-C,
the provision of subsidy is subject to the income threshold of $30,000, above which the subsidy
phases out. Similarly to the Experiments 1-C and 1-D of providing a subsidy, there is a large
eﬀect on the private insurance coverage. The comparison between Experiments 2-B and 2-C will
be similar to that between 1-C and 1-D, i.e. the tradeoﬀ between the coverage and eﬃciency or
the cost of providing incentives.
At the bottom of Table 5, we display the TURsa m o n gt h o s en o to ﬀered a group insurance
21across health expenditure shocks x and income shocks z.I nE x p e r i m e n t2 - B ,c o m p a r e dt o2 - A ,
there is a much larger increase of the take-up ratios among lower-income households. Providing
a subsidy is more eﬀective on them than tax deduction since they do not pay a high tax, or
not at all if unemployed. The policy 2-C also works eﬀectively to raise the coverage among the
poor, while the coverage among the rich increases only marginally and much less than in 2-B. As
s h o w ni nt h eTURs over the expenditure shocks x, both subsidy policies encourage the purchase
among healthier agents, since they face a lower premium cost, the large part of which can be
covered by the subsidy.
When comparing Experiments 2-B and 1-C (or 2-C and 1-D), the diﬀerence is whether to
keep the current regressive structure of the group insurance tax beneﬁt, or to correct it by making
the subsidy independent of the individual marginal tax rates. In the former case (2-B and 2-C),
the ﬁscal cost is higher and τy’s are 5.336% and 5.017% as opposed to 5.209% and 4.895% in 1-C
and 1-D. Also, the overall coverage and welfare are higher when we restore the vertical equity.
Increased risk-sharing will reduce the precautionary saving motives and the aggregate capital
and output will be lower than in their benchmark levels. In addition, the increased government
involvement will raise the expenditures to be ﬁnanced by taxation and the proportional income
tax rate τy will be higher at 5.336% and 5.017% in Experiments 2-B and 2-C, compared to
4.546% in the benchmark. However, the gains from a higher coverage dominates the negative
eﬀects and the overall welfare level is higher under both experiments.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We set up a model of endogenous health insurance decision in a general equilibrium model rich
enough to generate insurance demand closely resembling that observed in the data. We then
examine the eﬀects of several tax reforms. The experiments indicate that the tax subsidy on
health insurance is desirable though not in the current form. Employer provided group insurance
has the feature that everyone can purchase a contract at the same premium price irrespective
of any individual characteristics - most importantly it is independent of current health status.
However, relatively healthy young agents want to opt out of this contract and either self-insure
or ﬁnd a cheaper insurance contract in the private market. A subsidy on group insurance can
therefore encourage even healthy agents to sign up and alleviate the adverse selection problem
that plagues the insurance contract. One experiment conﬁrms this intuition by showing that
the complete removal of the subsidy results in the deterioration of health quality in the group
insurance market, a rise in the group insurance premium, a signiﬁcant reduction in the insurance
coverage, which altogether reduces welfare. We also ﬁnd that there is room for improving welfare
by restructuring the current subsidy system. Extending the subsidy to the private insurance
market to restore horizontal equity is eﬀective in raising the insurance coverage and enhancing
welfare. An even larger welfare gain is achieved if the government also correct for vertical
inequality by eliminating regressiveness of the subsidy system in the group insurance market.
Our work highlights the importance of studying health policy in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Equilibrium prices will necessarily be aﬀected by changes in policy. For example altering
the tax treatment of health insurance premia changes the composition of those agents signing up
22and therefore the equilibrium insurance premium. Altering the attractiveness of health insurance
also aﬀects precautionary saving motives, which in turn determines factor prices such as wages
and interest rates. We have also shown that it is important to capture the ﬁscal consequences of a
reform - providing subsidy will aﬀect the taxes that must be raised on other sources. The changes
in insurance demand can aﬀect the other government sponsored programs such as Medicaid.
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23Table 1: Parameters of the model
Parameter Description Values
Preferences
β discount factor 0.9496
σ relative risk aversion 2.0
{hy,h o} health measures {1.0000,0.7738}
Technology and production
α capital share 0.36
δ depreciation rate of capital 0.06
Government
{a0,a 1,a 2} income tax parameters (progressive part) {0.258,0.768,0.739}
τy income tax parameter (proportional part) 4.538%
¯ c Social Insurance threshold assets level 12.500% of average income
τss Social Security tax rate 10.569%
Social Security replacement ratio 45%
qmed(x) Medicare coverage ratio {0.299,0.381,0.605,0.713,0.639}
τmed Medicare tax rate 2.031%
pmed Medicare premium 2.11% of per capita output
Demographics
ρo retirement probability 2.22%
ρd death probability after retirement 10.85%
Endowment and health
Z labor productivity shocks (Z) {0.045,0.455,0.804,1.241,2.439}
ΠZ,E — transition probabilities of Z and E see text
Xy health expenditures shocks (young) {0.005,0.045,0.176,0.467,1.522}
Πxy — transition probabilities see text
Xo health expenditures shocks (old) {0.026,0.129,0.437,1.059,2.835}
Πxo — transition probabilities see text
Private health insurance
q(x) coverage ratio {0.592,0.646,0.719,0.845,0.891}
p insurance premium 6.755% of average income
ψ premium covered by a ﬁrm (%) 85.0%
24Table 2: Take-up ratios by health expenditures: model vs data
225mmHealth expenditures x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
0.0050 0.0462 0.1827 0.4857 1.6074
TUR all
data 0.7382 0.8057 0.7995 0.7909 0.7652
model 0.8092 0.8057 0.7995 0.7909 0.7652
TUR G (ie =1 )
data 0.9515 0.9844 0.9881 0.9910 0.9624
model 0.9941 0.9957 0.9971 0.9978 0.9983
TUR noG (ie =0 )
data 0.3915 0.5796 0.5825 0.4984 0.4894
model 0.5731 0.5631 0.5472 0.5267 0.4676
Table 3: Take-up ratios by income: model vs data
225mmIncome z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
0.0416 0.4934 0.8559 1.2948 2.5328
TUR all
data 0.4785 0.7211 0.8871 0.9556 0.9677
model 0.3958 0.7856 0.9448 0.9867 0.9825
TUR G (ie =1 )
data 0.8732 0.9275 0.9754 0.9929 0.9942
model 0.8581 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
TUR noG (ie =0 )
data 0.4161 0.4402 0.5836 0.7455 0.7622
model 0.3538 0.5883 0.8117 0.9349 0.8996
25Table 4: Experiment 1: abolishing deductibility of group insurance premium / ﬁxing regressive-
ness
Benchmark 1-A 1-B 1-C 1-D
p $2,061 $2,974 $2,057 $2,055 $2,055
TUR all 80.53% 72.73% 81.35% 94.21% 92.93%
TUR noG 56.26% 56.45% 57.54% 86.81% 83.89%
TUR G 99.53% 85.48% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Group 99.53% 57.25% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Private 0.00% 28.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Agg. output 1.0000 0.9936 0.9995 0.9937 0.9936
Agg. capital 1.0000 0.9825 0.9985 0.9827 0.9824
Interest rate 6.040% 6.177% 6.051% 6.175% 6.177%
Wage rate 1.0000 0.9936 0.9995 0.9937 0.9936
τy 4.546% 4.313% 4.437% 5.209% 4.895%
CEV - -1.800% 0.056% 0.260% 0.275%
Wealth Gini 0.5570 0.5597 0.5574 0.5515 0.5530
Aggregate output and capital and wage rate are normalized in terms of their benchmark levels.
1-A: abolish group insurance deductibility from income and payroll tax bases
1-B: abolish group insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide credit for group
insurance at the average income tax rate
1-C: 1-B plus provide credit of $1,000 if no access to group insurance
1-D: 1-B plus provide credit of $1,000 if no access to group insurance, subject to annual income
< $30,000
26Table 5: Experiment 2: extending tax deductibility or subsidy to the non-group insurance market
Benchmark 2-A 2-B 2-C
p $2,061 $2,060 $2,058 $2,058
TUR all 80.53% 88.69% 94.05% 92.65%
TUR noG 56.26% 74.83% 86.81% 83.83%
TUR G 99.53% 99.54% 99.72% 99.55%
Group 99.53% 99.54% 99.72% 83.83%
Private 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Agg. output 1.0000 0.9987 0.9942 0.9940
Agg. capital 1.0000 0.9963 0.9840 0.9833
Interest rate 6.040% 6.068% 6.165% 6.170%
Wage rate 1.0000 0.9987 0.9942 0.9940
τy 4.546% 4.849% 5.336% 5.017%
CEV - 0.144% 0.204% 0.208%
Wealth Gini 0.5570 0.5532 0.5515 0.5543
TUR noG by z
z1 0.0416 35.38% 51.23% 74.25% 73.77%
z2 0.4934 58.83% 89.66% 95.41% 90.02%
z3 0.8559 81.17% 99.30% 99.23% 94.35%
z4 1.2948 93.49% 99.86% 99.42% 97.24%
z5 2.5328 89.96% 99.93% 99.81% 91.72%
TUR noG by x
x1 0.0050 57.31% 76.14% 93.32% 90.32%
x2 0.0462 56.31% 74.69% 84.33% 81.29%
x3 0.1827 54.72% 72.98% 79.21% 76.32%
x4 0.4857 52.67% 71.14% 75.92% 73.32%
x5 1.6074 46.76% 67.05% 69.24% 67.12%
Aggregate output and capital and wage rate are normalized in terms of their benchmark levels.
All: keep the current tax deduction system for the group insurance
2-A: extend the same deduction for the purchase of private insurance
2-B: 2-A plus provide credit of $1,000 if no access to group insurance
2-C: 2-A plus provide credit of $1,000 if no access to group insurance, subject to annual income
< $30,000
27